BUKELE ALL THE WAY: An analysis of the means and methods of the quasi-democratic state of El Salvador.

INTRODUCTION

Few leaders in modern history have sparked as much controversy—and admiration—as Nayib Bukele. Here is a man who took one of the world’s most violent nations and, in less than a decade, turned it into a country safer than Canada. He did so not through democratic consensus, but through a democratically elected autocracy—an iron-fisted rule that traded civil liberties for order.

El Salvador was once a war zone, with murder rates surpassing failed states like Haiti and the Congo. Today, its streets are eerily quiet, its prisons overflowing, and its leader hailed as a visionary. But beneath this miracle of security lies a darker reality: mass arrests, suspended rights, and a democracy hollowed out from within.

This is not just a story about crime reduction. It’s about what a society is willing to sacrifice for safety, and whether the ends truly justify the means. In this essay, I dissect the Bukele Model: its brutal efficiency, its hidden costs, and its dangerous allure. Is he a savior or a dictator? A genius or a gambler? The answer, like his presidency, is anything but simple. That is why I will want to know your thoughts on President Bukele in the comment space. With all my research done, I will give you an analysis of the means by which Bukele was able to make headway and succeed, and allow you to come to your own conclusion about it.

In this essay, I wish to analyse President Bukele, “the world’s coolest dictator,” to understand what he did in order to achieve the turnaround of El Salvador in the last decade. The immediate results of such actions, other areas where he was seemingly ahead of his time. I would also do an analysis of his right-wing rebrand and its aims, benefits, and drawbacks for the Salvadoran people. He takes big bets, and so far they seem to pay off.

The Rise of Bukele

President Bukele portrays himself as a cool and relatable leader who is a political outsider. At the

same time, he controls a propaganda machine that allows him to remain popular despite actions that

might be less palatable to voters under a different leader. In February 2020, after less than nine months in office, Bukele demonstrated his first autocratic tendencies when he called for a special congressional session, stormed Congress with heavily armed military personnel, and demanded funding for his Territorial Control Plan (PCT), implicitly threatening to dissolve the congress or even stage a coup. Throughout Latin America, such an act would have caused an uproar, and few leaders could have survived the backlash. Not only did Bukele survive, but Salvadorans applauded him. A key reason the congress hesitated to approve the budget for the PCT was that the plan was poorly defined and contained strategies similar to other mano dura policies pursued in the past.

La Mano Dura ("Firm Hand" or "Iron Fist") is a set of tough-on-crime policies put in place by Latin American governments in response to the problem of gang violence, organized crime and insecurity. These policies were put in place in response to popular calls for the government to do something about the problem of rampant crime. La Mano Dura policies have come under criticism due to human rights concerns.

The president's official website describes the first phase as "preparation," which involves taking control of the area and cracking down on crime, but it doesn’t explain how this will be done. This phase repeats past strategies, such as using the military to police the population. While the idea of "phases" implies these measures are temporary, the ongoing state of emergency since March 2022 shows that the heavy military and police presence was never meant to be short-term—it’s how President Bukele governs.

Bukele credits the reduction in crime and homicide rates during his first years in office to his PCT. However, two key factors were likely more influential: the perfect opportunity, the COVID-19 pandemic, and gang negotiations.

The COVID-19 Pandemic

Just one month after Bukele stormed Congress with the military, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared a global pandemic, presenting a perfect opportunity to restrict civil liberties under the guise of public health concerns. On March 21, 2020, just 10 days after the WHO declared a global pandemic and with only one confirmed COVID-19 case in the country, Bukele mandated a countrywide lockdown. While quarantines were common during this period, it was unusual for such a small country with only one confirmed case to impose such strict measures so early. Granted, in hindsight, these measures were probably the reason why El Salvador reported the lowest number of COVID-related deaths in all of LAC. By June 2020, El Salvador began easing restrictions, but certain lockdown measures continued throughout much of 2020. The government’s strict enforcement of quarantine rules, including the controversial detentions of those accused of violating the lockdown, lasted until late August, even after the Supreme Court had ruled that further extensions of the lockdown without legislative approval were unconstitutional. In reality, Bukele’s extreme response to the pandemic was driven less by public health concerns than by an effort to reduce civil liberties and limit mobility, to lower homicide rates to cement his popularity.

Gang Negotiations.

In September 2020, El Faro reported that, according to government records, the Bukele administration had been negotiating with MS-13 to reduce homicide rates and gain electoral support. However, Bukele continues to deny those allegations and credits his administration and his PCT as the reasons for the sharp decline in crime and violence. Bukele’s strategy included behind-the-scenes negotiation with gangs, which aimed to influence voter turnout in gang-controlled areas, helping him secure the congressional majority needed to advance policies that would otherwise face legislative or judicial resistance. In February 2021, Bukele’s party, Nuevas Ideas [New Ideas], secured a supermajority in congress, which enabled him to take significant steps to undermine democratic institutions. He used this power to attack the judiciary by removing the attorney general and constitutional court judges who had previously ruled against some of his pandemic-related actions. Bukele replaced them with judges he expected would be loyal to him, further consolidating his control over the legal system. Demonstrating quick results and attributing them to his policies was crucial for Bukele’s administration to gain public support. This support allowed the government to continue implementing anti-democratic measures and violating human rights, all while justifying these actions under the guise of a popular mandate.

A key feature of the Bukele security model is a state of exception that has become the norm. In March of 2022, after a breakdown of negotiations with gangs, El Salvador experienced an extremely violent weekend when over 92 people were killed. This sudden surge gave way to the first declaration of a state of emergency, which has been extended monthly, a total of 30 times as of September 2024. Under this state of exception, constitutional rights, such as freedom of assembly and the right to a legal defense, have been suspended. States of exception inherently concentrate power in the hands of the executive, often eroding democratic checks and balances. This has been evident in Latin America, where a pattern of weakening democratic institutions has allowed sitting leaders to consolidate power, often transforming into elected autocrats. As these exceptions become increasingly routine, they risk fostering authoritarian rule under the guise of maintaining public security. If public sentiment shifts, these same powers could be turned against dissenting citizens. A striking aspect of the Bukele administration is its remarkable popularity. Despite the erosion of democratic norms under his leadership, Bukele enjoys some of the highest approval ratings of any elected official globally—80–93 percent, depending on the survey. Paradoxically, even as El Salvador experiences democratic backsliding, a 2023 survey revealed that most Salvadorans still value democracy, with 64 percent expressing satisfaction with the current system. This contrast may be largely attributed to Bukele’s highly effective public relations strategy, which aggressively targets his critics while framing his actions as both legitimate and in line with democratic principles. This narrative, however, stands in stark opposition to the views of experts, human rights organizations, and activists, who frequently denounce his policies as undermining democracy.

The Bukele Model: Charisma, Centralized Power, and the Suspension of Civil Rights

While many leaders endorse the Bukele model in their rhetoric, they often overlook the practical challenges of implementing such policies. They also fail to acknowledge that El Salvador’s situation has unique characteristics that may not apply to other countries, such as the popularity of its leader, its small geographic size and population, and the focus on gangs rather than on transnational criminal organizations. The core components of Bukele’s approach—his manipulation of legislative and judicial systems, backdoor negotiations with gangs, and a perpetual state of exception—make it clear that what he presents as a security solution is, in reality, a pathway to authoritarianism. This analysis delves into the strategies Bukele uses, not as a blueprint for others to follow but as a cautionary tale about the dangers of sacrificing democratic norms for short-term security gains.

The Bukele model has three major components: a charismatic leader, an overhaul of democratic governance, and a suspension of civil rights. Each element is crucial for successfully implementing these hard-line approaches to crime. The success of this model relies on a cult of personality in which the leader carefully crafts and maintains his public image, in part, through his domination of social media and control of the media narrative. As president, Bukele leverages his marketing experience to promptly address any opposition and maintain a firm grip on his messaging. In doing so, he presents himself as the solution to the country’s violence. Bukele’s marketing strategy includes a series of documentary-style video clips that promote his image as a “modern strongman,” reinforcing the idea that his hard-line approach is forward-thinking, necessary, and effective. More recently, Bukele has adopted the title of “philosopher king,” a concept derived from Plato’s Republic, which argues that the ideal state is governed by philosophers and lovers of truth.

Bukele’s legislative support has been a key factor in his success. His party, Nuevas Ideas, shifted the political landscape, which was historically dominated by the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) and Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMNL) parties. In the 2021 election, Nuevas Ideas won 46 seats and with its coalition partners, secured an additional 15 seats, giving them a majority and reducing the opposition to just 23 seats. By the 2023 election, ARENA had only two seats, and the FMNL had none. Minor parties collectively secured just four seats, allowing Nuevas Ideas to obtain a supermajority in the legislative assembly and further consolidating Bukele’s grip.

To cement his party’s dominance, Bukele has redefined the country’s municipal boundaries, consolidating El Salvador’s 262 municipalities into 44 and further centralizing control in the hands

of the executive. This move reduces the number of elected officials and weakens local governance by concentrating power in the executive branch. With fewer municipalities, each becomes larger, making it harder for opposition parties to win seats. Previously, opposition parties could secure victories in smaller municipalities, but the consolidation has diluted their influence. In the larger municipalities, minority parties are less likely to win elections, as their power is spread too thin, leading to consistent losses in local elections.

A strong grip on the judiciary is also a key element. In 2021, Bukele initiated a purification of the judicial system, supposedly aimed at rooting out corruption within the judicial branch. The legislature mandated that judges aged 60 or over or those with 30 years of service retire from their positions. This forced one-third of the country’s judges into retirement, allowing Bukele to fill approximately 200 vacancies with loyalists. The Supreme Court was not spared from the purge; five judges were removed from their positions. Further, the attorney general was forcibly dismissed for his alleged affiliation with an opposition party. With control over both the legislature and the courts, Bukele bypassed the constitution to secure his reelection despite six articles prohibiting a president from serving more than five years. Through strategic maneuvering of the political system, Bukele has not only solidified his power but also circumvented constitutional limits.

Another key component of the apparent success of the Bukele model has been holding unofficial negotiations with criminal organizations and gangs. This symbiotic relationship means the control of violence becomes a strategic game, with each move, whether by the state or the gangs, potentially destabilizing security. Another important component is the willingness of a country’s criminal organizations to engage in negotiations and present demands that the state can address. More importantly, the feasibility of negotiations depends significantly on the organization type and size, the scope of criminal activities, and whether those activities extend beyond national borders.

Under this model, the executive branch can suspend civil liberties and carry out mass incarceration missions without due process. Authorities can arrest individuals based on vague grounds such as suspicious appearance or anonymous accusations, bypassing judicial oversight. This has led to the incarceration of over 77,000 people, accounting for 1.22 percent of the country’s population of 6.3 million. Another aspect of this operation is the severe overcapacity of prison facilities, some of which are running at 300 percent capacity. To contextualize the situation, the United States, which ranks second to El Salvador in terms of incarcerations per capita, has approximately 2.1 million incarcerated people; that number would need to rise to 6.62 million to match El Salvador’s rate. Brazil’s prisons are operating at 147 percent capacity, while Bolivia’s prisons are even more overwhelmed, running at 264 percent capacity. The South American continent has jailed more than twice as many inhabitants as any other region.

Additionally, the Bukele model requires significant investment, with the estimated total cost of the PCT around $575 million. The primary expense of the investment is the Terrorism Confinement Center (CECOT), which is the largest prison facility in the world by inmate capacity; the facility alone costs around $115 million to build. However, the cost of construction of the CECOT is only the initial expense. Operational expenses, including maintenance of technology, salaries of security personnel, infrastructure maintenance, and the logistics of transporting 40,000 inmates, add up to a hefty amount, though exact figures are unknown. During Bukele’s first term, his government relied on $7.77 billion in loans from international organizations, bonds, and private loans to support roughly 20 percent of its budget between 2019 and 2023. While avoiding default, the administration used high-interest loans and postponed some payments, like the pension fund contributions. As Bukele begins his second term, plans for further borrowing have raised concerns about the country’s financial sustainability.

Finally, the success of this model hinges, in part, on El Salvador’s relatively small population of 6 million. The country’s crime landscape is dominated by two gangs, MS-13 and Barrio 18, both of which are highly localized and lack significant transnational economic strength. MS-13’s annual revenue in 2016 amounted to an estimated $31.2 million, making the average wages for each member around $65 a month. This environment allows for less complex security measures than in countries where crime is driven by complex transnational criminal networks. For example, in Mexico, a cartel’s revenue ranges from $6 billion to $29 billion. As a result, Bukele’s model is a poor approach to effectively combating crime in the long term or have it replicated on a larger scale. Moreover, the geographical size of El Salvador allows for rapid territorial control, as well as terrain that is not as prohibitive as other mountains and valleys in the region.

Bukele’s Big Bet on Crypto.

It was during the research for my master’s degree dissertation around crypto in 2022 that I first heard about President Bukele, this was because it was around the time that the country not only gave federal recognition of Bitcoin as legal tender, but it was also the period that the country had started building a stockpile of Bitcoin in their strategic reserve.

El Salvador became the first country in the world to use bitcoin as legal tender, after it was adopted as such by the Legislative Assembly of El Salvador in 2021. It has been promoted by Nayib Bukele, the president of El Salvador, who claimed that it would improve the economy by making banking easier for Salvadorans and that it would encourage foreign investment. The adoption of Bitcoin as legal tender in El Salvador initially drew criticism both internationally and within El Salvador. On September 7, thousands of protestors gathered in San Salvador to protest the launch of Chivo and the adoption of bitcoin. The cause of these protests was concern over a lack of transparency regarding the creation of the Bitcoin Law and Chivo, and the use of tax dollars to purchase Bitcoin. The limited rate of internet penetration in El Salvador would also limit the number of people who could make use of cryptocurrency. Many international financial experts warned that bitcoin's volatility would introduce unnecessary risk and instability to El Salvador's underdeveloped economy. In July 2021, Moody's Investors Service downgraded the credit rating of El Salvador, citing Bukele's fiscal policies and the adoption of bitcoin as factors.

El Salvador announced on Wednesday the purchase of a bitcoin, which takes the total in the country's strategic reserve to above 6,102 coins, the National Bitcoin Office posted on social media. The bitcoin purchase announcement comes days after the International Monetary Fund board approved a 40-month program with El Salvador for $1.4 billion that implied a downgrade of the cryptocurrency's status in the Central American country. Bitcoin cannot be used to pay taxes, and its acceptance by the public is voluntary, which is not what was expected when it was given a legal tender status back in 2021. El Salvador has bought 12 bitcoins since the IMF announced last week the board's approval of the agreement reached in December. It currently holds near $550 million in bitcoin, according to the government.

This move has also garnered him international acclaim as a visionary who was capable of spotting the potential for Bitcoin, particularly when Bitcoin shortly climbed over $100,000 earlier this year.

The Results?

The results speak for themselves, as in 2021, El Salvador’s murder rate was on par with that of Guatemala or Brazil, or Haiti, and now their Homicide rates are lower than Canada. In 2015, El Salvador was one of the most violent countries on earth, plagued by Gang crime stood at 105.2 per 100k To put that into perspective, Haiti is currently facing a wave of violence so vast that the state has all but collapsed, yet its homicide rate is at 62.2 per 100k still an insane figure. In 2024, El Salvador’s homicide rate hit an all-time low of 1.9 per 100k which is identical to Canada’s homicide rate. However, it must be stated that the comparison isn’t Apples to Apples, this is because the measures and rules that the El Salvadoran government followed differed from the standard of measuring homicides in most nations, these are the Bogota Protocols, meaning things like bodies found in mass graves were not included in the calculations. The FT reported that the country of El Salvador, in the month of December, went 24 straight days without a single murder. Now, one has to ask if the ends justify the means, and in doing so, one needs to look holistically at what those ends are. For example, El Salvador's Foreign Direct Investment for 2023 was 638.12 million US  dollars, a 6128.67% increase from 2022. From being an attractive business destination and receiving companies seeking to relocate to the continent (nearshoring), through the growth of tourism by more than 40% (according to the UN), having a revaluation of real estate of between 15% and 45% (while in dynamic countries it does not exceed 9%), El Salvador is demonstrating that a safe country is a productive country and that it is a safe and productive country.

Bukele’s Next Big Bet: America

Wherever you land on the political aisle, it would still be a shrewd matter to notice that Trump’s policies are autocratically leaning. From inauguration day, when he signed over 200 executive orders, some flying in the face of the U.S. Constitution, such as the end to birthright citizenship, or using federal funds as leverage against prominent educational institutions such as Harvard and Yale University. To even the little things, such as his imposition and desire to have more control over interest rates, over the Fed chair. Such actions and desire to not just be president but king make things clearer as to why Trump himself has called the Salvadoran president a “great friend.” It would not be farfetched to say that President Trump wishes to replicate the same autocratic nature of the Salvadoran government in America.

Ever the shrewd visionary, President Bukele is doing what he believes he must to preserve and continue the progression and prosperity of the Salvadoran people. I believe his current branding that panders towards not only republican/conservative views but also panders to the President himself is to ensure a few crucial aspects that should, in theory, lead to the prosperity of his people.

The first one is already evident. The prison CECOT is already generating external revenue from the U.S. As reported by AP, the US is set to pay El Salvador $6 million to imprison 300 alleged members of the Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua. El Salvador confirms it will house these individuals for one (1) year, pending the United States’ decision on their long-term disposition," AP quoted a memo from El Salvador's Foreign Ministry. That is about 5.2% of the cost of the prison already recouped. So, positioning CECOT as a prison for hire would lead to more government revenue and have the prison not only have a return on investment but also use the money to maintain the prison.

Incidentally, the announcement by the President of the U.S., which established the strategic bitcoin reserve, caused an incredible boost to the value of El Salvador’s bitcoin strategic reserve. I do not believe that there is a causal link between Bukele’s actions and the announcement, though.

Another benefit that can be forecasted is the fact that, because President Bukele is endeared by Trump, he can negotiate beneficial terms in terms of the tariffs that would not cripple its economy. It is not far-fetched to believe that President Bukele could be given more than fair tariff terms, which in turn could lead to a greater investment in the country.

Permit me to speculate and say that what President Bukele might want is military protection. This is because, although he has allegedly usurped power and has imprisoned the only thing that could have been a suitable opposition to him in the form of gangs, in order to maintain this control and power, he would be better off helped by the might and power of the US military. This military would be in place to ensure that the investments in the country are protected.

Like every gamble, on the balance of probabilities, one hopes to achieve the best possible outcome but has to be prepared for the very real, very possible negative outcome. To quote Bruce Wayne, “He has the power to wipe out the entire galaxy, and if we believe there is even a 1% chance that he will do this, we have to take this as an absolute certainty.” On the face of it, having the president of the richest nation with the largest consumers in the world, the largest and most well-funded military in the world, with the nuclear might to level the entire planet as a bit friend is a brilliant way to remain on the safe side.

This, however, does mean that you have to be aware of how he has treated his allies, as seen in the way the entire administration has acted towards the Ukrainian president with such disdain, and the vice president has treated the European Union and its leaders with even greater disdain. President Bukele must either have an incredible amount of blind faith to accept that there is a possibility that they could be in the same position and create a contingency plan if the situation occurs.

Lessons Learned

Given growing concerns about transnational criminal organizations in LAC, security will likely remain of paramount importance to voters in the region. LAC elections will continue to feature homages to Bukele and his ideas and promote mano dura solutions. The conclusions of this brief demonstrate that how the Bukele model is discussed in LAC is just as important as the details of the plan itself, since the latter are scarcely known by LAC politicians. For now, the Bukele model continues to appear novel and, as such, benefits from being juxtaposed with failed security policies of past eras. The experience of El Salvador indicates that appeals to human rights and the rule of law are unlikely to yield alternatives that successfully attract voters, at least compared to the accomplishments of states of exception. Bukele has made politically effective arguments that the entire country of El Salvador was a prison before he enacted his policies and that insecurity in the streets is a prison in itself. Frequently, he has used the metaphor of a metastasizing cancer requiring an aggressive treatment plan. Further, he has lamented how policymakers previously cared more about criminals’ rights than society’s right to live freely.

Security will likely remain of paramount importance to voters in the region. LAC elections will continue to feature homages to Bukele and his ideas and promote mano dura solutions. It is important to develop mano dura policy alternatives that acknowledge the dynamic of violence within the region and the need for occasional short-term states of exception, but also plans mid-and long-term capacity-building solutions. Without a set of alternatives, policymakers will lack a democracy-preserving solution for growing security threats.

Conclusion

Nayib Bukele has done the unthinkable: he made a failed state functional again. But at what cost? His blueprint—charisma, centralized power, and the suspension of rights—is not just a security strategy. It is a slow-motion coup against democracy itself.

For now, Salvadorans cheer him. The streets are safe, the tourists are coming, and the Bitcoin bets are paying off. But history warns us: autocracy is a one-way street. The same powers used to crush gangs today can be turned on dissenters tomorrow. The prisons built for criminals can someday hold journalists. The emergency decrees that "saved" the nation may never lift.

Bukele’s greatest trick? Making authoritarianism look cool, modern, and necessary. He is not just a leader—he is a brand, a meme, a philosopher-king for the digital age. And his model is spreading. From Argentina to Ecuador, politicians now whisper: "Why can’t we do what Bukele did?” But here’s the truth they ignore: El Salvador is not a template—it’s a cautionary tale. Security without freedom is not progress—it’s a different kind of prison. And in the end, even the most popular strongmen face the same reckoning: No one rules forever.

The question is not whether Bukele succeeded. He did. The real question is: What comes after him? Because when the strongman falls, what remains is either a democracy rebuilt—or a tyranny entrenched.

For now, the world watches. And waits.